ABSTRACT

As paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, the innovated regulations on appeal is both one of the major highlights of the reform of the matrimonial nullity process, and, at the same time, one of its major critical issues. The main reason for this is that one must consider that on this fundamental right is played out the search for a delicate balance – very difficult to achieve – between two equivalent pastoral and juridical needs: on the one hand, preventing nullity processes from dragging on too long, causing the faithful’s confidence in the Church’s ability to respond on a matter as sensitive as matrimonial matters to wane; on the other hand, protect the right to defense, which finds in the appeal one of its most characterizing aspects. Among the major interpretive difficulties is the one concerning whether or not is possible to confirm with the abbreviated procedure not only affirmative judgments but also negative ones. The case decided by the Rotal decree under comment grafts itself into this procedural bipolarity by leaning sharply in favor of the thesis that limits the applicability of the procedure ex can. 1680, § 2 to judgments pro nullitate only, proposing an interesting and exhaustive argument in support.