Table of contents

1. Introduction: closed and open modalities of dialogue and the necessary reorientation of the Church-State relationship in a non-dogmatic perspective - 2. Preconditions for the feasibility of dialogue: the recovery of the deontological dimension of the legal concept of "person" and "religious freedom" - 3. Consequential recognition of the Habermasian thesis on the "thresholds of entry of secular reasons" and the Church-State dialogue path based on the necessary acceptance of "parallel renunciations" in secular and religious citizens - 4. The "non negotiable principles" of the Church from a natural law perspective - 5. The theoretical limit of disinterest in the content aspects of legal norms in general and ecclesiastical norms in particular. Reframing the problem of democratic State-Church dialogue in a non-formalist key - 6. Non-automatic critical imputability of 'ethical relativism' to the democratic form of government, but to the supposedly democratic way of interpreting the expression 'individual subjective freedom' and its ethical limits